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1 Introduction
This paper analyses the efFect on a compétitive equilibrium of a change
in the characteristics of goods. Such a change can be interpreted in
différent ways. For example, advertising may modify the characteristics (see
Luski-Wettstein (1986)). More generally any new information modifies the
characteristics (Stigler & Becker (1977)). To simplify the interprétation, we
assume that information is exchanged at zéro cost. The internet is a good
example.
We consider a pure exchange economy. Préférences of the agents
dépend on the characteristics of goods (Lancaster (1966), Michael and
Becker (1973)). Thèse characteristics dépend on the information hold by
the agent. New freely available information modifies thèse characteristics,
welfare of agents and equilibrium.
We show that more information increases welfare (in fact, a linear
combination of the utilities of the agents). But it does not necessarily benefit
the agent whose information has increased.
Section 2 présents the model, effects are analysed in Section 3 and an
example is studied in Section 4.
* We thank a référée of the review, V. Ginsburgh and B. Wigniolle for their suggestions. Remaining errors are
ours.
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We assume that the préférences of consumer i, i = 1,2,... , m dépend on
the characteristics of goods and information modifies thèse characteristics.
There is a transformation of market goods into characteristics. Information
is an input in the agents' production function of commodities.
Like Luski and Wettstein (1994), we assume that the effect of infor
mation / is only tied to good 1. We identify the other commodities with
characteristics : Zlh = Clh ; h = 2,..., n, Ci is the consumed quantity of good
h. For commodity 1, we hâve (see Luski and Wettstein (1994), p.311) :
Z{ = = g'Cu
An increase of information increases g1. The utility function of agent i is
Ui = Ui{giClC*2.....,Cin).
Agent i's endowment is wl = (w\, w2,
numéraire, his budget constraint is
Taking good 1 as a
(1)
where ph is the price of good h. Assuming that ail prices ph are positive,
that the utility function is strictly concave, differentiable and vérifies the
Inada conditions, the behaviour of agent i is characterized by the following
first order conditions :
jU\ = —Ui /» = 2,...,n
Ph
where U{,..., £/£ are the partial dérivâtives of Ul.




3 EfFect of an increase of information
Let us first consider the eifect of a change in prices (p2,... ,pn)- Differen-
tiating (1) leads to
dC\ + ^dPh(Cl - w{) + i = 0,
h='2
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and the marginal effect of a change in prices on the utility U% is
h=2
Substituting (3) for dC\ into this expression leads to :
h=2 h=2 J /»=2
Using conditions (2) we see that
n
dpf/1 = g'Ul £ dpnlwi - Cl). (4)
The effect of a change in information combines the direct effect on the utility
Ul and the change induced on equilibrium prices. The effects on equilibrium
prices are complex (thèse effects will be analysed in an example). Assuming
that the equilibrium exists, we can show that there is an increase in welfare
in the following sensé.
Proposition 1 // the information of at least one agent increases and if
the information of the others agents does not decrease, then necessarily the
utility of at least one agent increases. More precisely, a linear combination
with positive coeficients of the utilities of the m agents increases.
Proof : Consider a marginal change in information of agent i, dg{ ^ 0,
i = 1,... ,m. The corresponding change in utility of agent i in equilibrium
is
dU* = CÎUidg* + dpU\ (5)
where dpU% is the effect of the change of equilibrium prices on utility (4).
We also hâve
™h - Clh)dph = 0 (6)
since in equilibrium, Y?iLi(wh ~ ^D = 0, h = 1,... ,n. For any séquence
Ai, i = 1,..., m, (5) implies
m m m
Y, ^idU* = Y ^iCÎUidg1 + Y *idpU\ (7)
Thus, with At = l/(gtU{) > 0, (5) and (6) imply
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4 An example
In the following simple example with two agents and two goods, we assume
that only agent 1 gathers more information (dgl > 0,dg2 = 0)1. This
example exhibits différent cases : the utility of both agents increases, or the
utility of the agent 1 only increases or it decreases. Consider
1 _ I 1 _ I '
a>0
(w\,wl) = {b,l) and {w2,w2) = (l,b), b > 0.
For g1 = g2 = 1, the compétitive equilibrium is :
~ i p = 1,
r r r
2 -'-'
The equilibrium conditions for g1 ^ g2 = 1 are
Cl -b + p{Cl - 1) = 0, Cj + C2 = 2fi = C\+Cl
By differentiating thèse conditions we obtain the effect of a marginal change
of g1 in the neighborhood of the equilibrium (g1 = g2 = 1, p = 1,
dC\ = -^i(/i - 1 + <r/0 (i - l) dg\
dC\ = -dC\, dC$ = {l- ix)dp - dC\, dC\ = -dC\.
Using rff/1 = m^1 [dC,1 +(idgl + dC\] and rft/2 = /^ [rfC2 + rfC22], we
obtain
~1)] dgX ■
1 We could assume that there are two types of agents.Damien Gaumont, Philippe Michel^
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Figure 1 shows the welfare changes in the space of parameters a and
6, when information increases for agent 1 only.
In région [T] the utility of agent 1 decreases. Ail utilities increase in
régions[3], but the utility of agent 2 who has no new information decreases
in régions [2].
The relative price p of good 2 increases (decreases) when the elasticity
of substitution a is smaller (larger) than 1. For agent 1, there is a direct
positive effect of dg1 on her utility. With an increase in p (case a < 1) the
induced effect is négative (positive) when she is a net buyer (seller) of good
2, i.e. b > 1 (6 < 1). In the case a < 1 and b > 1, this négative effect may
dominate the direct positive effect, when a is small enough (région[T]).
For agent 2, there is only the indirect effect of the change in price p,
and a similar interprétation applies.368 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 70(3), 2004
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